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1.  Introduction 
 
Inflation dynamics crucially depend on how inflation expectations are formed. Modern 
macroeconomics emphasizes that an engineering approach to policy-making analysis 
fails, due to its failure to account for human behaviour. In most modern macroeconomics 
expectations are modelled in accordance with rational expectations (Muth, 1961). 
Researchers have systematically explored the implications of rational expectations for the 
conduct of policy. Rational expectations (paraphrasing Evans and Honkapohja (2001)) 
assume economic agents who are extremely knowledgeable. An alternative approach is to 
limit their knowledge, so that as time goes by and available data changes, so does the 
agents’ forecasting rule. Thus, the alternative can be understood as implying bounded 
rationality. In fact it means limiting agents’ knowledge about the true structure of the 
model. Adaptive learning is particularly attractive to reckon with the implications from 
pervasive structural change and permanent transformation that characterizes the 
economic environment of modern economies. 
 
The rational expectations revolution had deep implications for our understanding of 
policy-making. Kydland and Prescott (1977) pointed to strong tensions between optimal 
and time-consistent policies. Specifically, they have shown that the time-consistent 
policy-maker will not take the effects of future policies on private sector expectations 
into account. The distinction between optimal and time-consistent policies led to the 
corresponding distinction between policies under commitment and under discretion. This 
paper looks at the implications from adaptive learning, on the part of the private sector, 
for the conduct of optimal monetary policy. Inspired by Svensson (2003), we compare 
outcomes from “simple rules” with optimal policy that takes expectations formation 
explicitly into account. Often, learning has been used, in the literature, as an equilibrium 
selection mechanism. The idea is simply that if a particular rational expectations 
equilibrium is not learnable then it can be excluded. In most papers, policy is modelled 
by assuming a simple instrument rule. Svensson (2003) argues that simple instrument 
rules fail to capture how central banks actually conduct policy. If adaptive learning is 
(empirically) a good description of expectations formation, then it is important to 
characterise optimal monetary policy in such a setting. 
 
  2Modelling the optimal behaviour of central banks requires specifying its information set. 
In this paper, we consider the (admittedly) extreme case of sophisticated central banking. 
Specifically, we assume that the central bank has full information about the structure of 
the economy (a standard assumption under rational expectations). In our case, the 
information set includes knowledge about the precise mechanism generating private 
sector’s expectations. 
 
Kydland and Prescott’s seminal contribution opened the way to considering the effects 
from systematic monetary policy actions and allowed for a theoretical account of 
important policy concepts such as credibility and reputation. In a world of rational 
expectations, policy-makers (sufficiently) concerned about their long-run reputation do 
not yield to short run temptations. The performance of the economy is better as a 
consequence. Thus, in a rational expectations framework, it is possible to justify primacy 
of long run goals such as price stability. It is interesting to ask: are there similar 
mechanisms at play when we depart from rational expectations?  
 
In this paper, we find that endogenous expectations, under adaptive learning, make 
anchoring of inflation expectations crucial. We explain the conclusion through a number 
of systematic comparisons. First, we compare outcomes of “simple rules” under adaptive 
learning and rational expectations. The “simple rule” we use is simply the optimal 
discretionary policy under rational expectations. We show that inflation is more stable 
under rational expectations. Moreover, under adaptive learning, inflation dynamics 
eventually become explosive under the simple rule. 
  
Second, we compare outcomes, under optimal policy, for the alternatives of rational 
expectations and adaptive learning. In this case explosive behaviour never occurs. The 
different expectation formation mechanism implies interesting similarities (and 
differences) for optimal policy. Anchoring inflation expectations is always key. However, 
the mechanism through which anchoring occurs are different, as future policies play no 
role under adaptive learning. Nevertheless, in specific circumstances there are similarities 
between the monetary policy reaction functions. 
 
Third, we compare the differences relative to optimal policies under the two alternative 
expectation formation mechanisms. The comparison will allow us to argue that the 
  3difference between naïve and optimal central banking (under adaptive learning) does 
have some similarities with the difference between discretion and commitment (under 
rational expectations). 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 will introduce the model and compare 
outcomes under rational expectations and adaptive learning using a common rule. The 
rule is the optimal rule under rational expectations (assuming time consistency). Section 
3 will make the same comparison for fully optimal policies conditional on the alternative 
expectation formation mechanisms. Section 4 will conclude. 
 
2. Benchmark: Rational expectations versus adaptive learning 
 
In this section, we use a very simple New Keynesian model of inflation dynamics and 
analyze the behavior of inflation under a simple monetary policy reaction function under 
two different assumptions regarding the way the private sector forms its inflation 
expectations. The New Keynesian model is standard (e.g. Woodford, 2003). It is 
consistent with the following microeconomic assumptions. Producers set prices in an 
environment of nominal rigidity, formalized using the Calvo (1983) shortcut. That is, in a 
given period, a specific firm will be “allowed” to reset its price optimally with an 
exogenous and constant probability. Firms produce using a technology that exhibits 
decreasing returns to labour. Furthermore, preferences of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type 
introduce monopolistic competition, with a continuum of otherwise identical firms. 
Finally, output is assumed to be demand determined, which means that firms will sell 
whatever quantity demanded at its current price. These four assumptions create a role for 
monetary policy, as without intervention markets may produce inefficiently. A simple 
way to see that this is the case is to note that since all firms are symmetric and marginal 
cost is increasing in production, the optimal allocation will be such that all firms have the 
same level of output. However, with some prices fixed, this will typically not be the case. 
Optimal monetary policy will strive to equalize relative prices of firms of the two groups, 
to avoid dispersion in the output distribution. The features described so far are almost 
always present in new Keynesian models.  
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First, motivated by the empirical fact that inflation is relatively persistent, we introduce 
indexation to lagged inflation among the firms, which do not reset their price optimally 
along the lines of Christiano et.al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). In this case, 
current inflation will have two components, one coming from the optimally reset prices 
(the only component in the standard framework) and one due to the fact that all other 
prices change in proportion to lagged inflation. Second, we assume that there is a 
temporary cost-push shock that affects inflation. In terms of microeconomics, this can be 
motivated by a stochastic intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between goods as in 
Steinsson (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2003), leading to a time-varying mark-up on 
marginal cost. We introduce this feature as a short-cut to get a trade-off for optimal 
monetary policy, which otherwise will be trivial under the perfect information 
assumption. 
 
In terms of equations, the discussion above implies a Phillips curve of the form 
(1)  ) ( 1 1 t t t t t t u x + + Ε + = + − κ π β γπ ω π , 
where π is inflation, x is the output gap, γ, β and κ are parameters, u is a cost-push shock 
(assumed i.i.d.) and   . The period social welfare function is assumed to be 
of the form 
1 ) 1 (
− + = βγ ω
(2)   , 
2 2
1) ( t t t t x L λ γπ π + − = −
where λ is a parameter indicating the relative weight on output gap stabilisation. We will 
assume here that the central bank uses the social welfare function to guide its policy 
decisions. Note also that the optimal inflation target is assumed to be zero.  
 
Next, we consider two assumptions regarding the formation of inflation expectations in 
equation (1). The standard assumption is to assume rational (or model-consistent) 
expectations. In this case, the private sector knows the structure of the economy as shown 
in (1) and the monetary policy reaction function implied by the central bank’s loss 
function (2). In this case, it turns out that optimal monetary policy under discretion only 
responds to the exogenous shock, and not to lagged inflation (in contrast to when the loss 
function consists of squared inflation and output, see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999)). 
Hence, optimal discretionary policy is described by 
(3)  t t u x α − = . 
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We assume, for simplicity, that the output gap is the central bank’s policy instrument. 
Without loss of generality, we could alternatively have used a short-term interest rate as 
the policy maker’s instrument by introducing an IS curve linking the output gap to the 
real interest rate. Under the optimal discretionary policy, the output gap only responds to 
the current cost-push shock. In particular, following a positive cost-push shock to 
inflation, monetary policy is tightened and the output gap falls. The strength of the 
response depends on the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and the weight on 
output gap stabilisation in the loss function. In contrast, if the central bank has access to a 
commitment technology, optimal policy will be more complicated and will utilize the fact 
that credible promises of future policy actions can help stabilize current inflation through 
expectations. 
 
For future reference, Figure 1 shows impulse responses for a one standard deviation cost-
push shock (calibration is discussed below) in the case of rational expectations under 
both discretion and commitment. The two key differences are that in the case of 
commitment the initial response is lower but then continues to persist even when the 
transitory shock is out of the economy. The reason is that by creating expectations of 
deflation, the incentive for current price-setters to increase prices is contained, leading to 
lower current inflation (see Woodford, 2003, for further discussion of this intuition). At 
first, it may seem like a small gain that the initial response of both inflation and output is 
slightly smaller under commitment, because the gain should be balanced against the cost 
of having to continue moving inflation and output also when the shock has left the 
economy. However, the welfare differences (at least in terms of relative levels) are large. 
Table 1 one shows that discretion leads to a 30% higher loss than commitment. The 
reason is that the loss function is quadratic in inflation and output and hence these 
relatively small differences lead to important consequences. This will be important when 
interpreting visually small differences in the tail-behaviour of the distribution of inflation 
explored below. 
 
It is easy to show that under rational expectations and discretionary monetary policy as in 
(3), the equilibrium dynamics of inflation will be given by a first-order autoregressive 
process: 
(4)  t t t u ~
1 + = − ρπ π  
  6Moreover, the degree of reduced-form inflation persistence will be given by the degree of 
inflation indexation in (1), i.e.  γ ρ =  .   
We now consider the alternative assumption regarding expectations formation and 
assume that private agents do not know the exact parameters of the economy. However, 
they do know the reduced-form structure of the economy, i.e. they do know the form of 
equation (4) and try to estimate this reduced-form recursively.  In particular, expectations 
are formed on the basis of a “constant gain” least squares algorithm implying perpetual 
learning.  
 
In particular, the agents estimate the following reduced-form equation for inflation,
2
(5)  t t t t u c + = −1 π π .           
Agents are rational in the bounded sense that they do not take into account the fact that 
the parameter c varies over time in an optimal way. That is, assuming that the agents 
know the structure of the equilibrium model, they could instead use a Kalman filter to 
optimally update their perception of the persistence parameter. One way to rationalize 
such behaviour of the private sector is in terms of robustness. Many different structural 
models are consistent with the same reduced form (with possibly different parameter 
values). Hence, basing the forecast of inflation on a reduced form model is one way to 
hedge against relying on an incorrect structural model, even though it is less efficient in 
case one happens to know the correct model.  
 
The following equations describe the recursive updating of the parameters estimated by 
the private sector. 




− − + = t t t t t t t t t c z y z R g c c
ι
(7)           ), ( 1 1 − − − + = t t t t t t R z z g R R
ι
where c is the vector of estimated parameters, R is the moment matrix, y is the dependent 
variable, z is the vector of explanatory variables and g is the gain. Following equation (5), 
in our case, inflation and lagged inflation are the dependent and explanatory variable 
respectively and c is a single parameter capturing the persistence of the AR(1) inflation 
process. Note that due to the learning dynamics the number of state variables is expanded 
                                                           
2  We assume that the private sector knows the inflation target (equal to zero). In future research, we intend 
to explore the implications of learning about the inflation target. 
  7to four: (ut , πt-1, Rt-1,  ct-1)., where the last two variables are predetermined and known by 
the central bank at the time they set policy at time t.  
 
  
Some further observations regarding the updating process are worth noting. First, we 
assume gt = φ, a constant gain. There are two reasons for considering the constant gain 
case. First. only in this case there will be permanent action coming from the learning 
algorithm. In the case of recursive least squares learning, i.e. when the gain is 1/t, which 
corresponds to agents running an OLS regression with an increasing sample-length, the 
estimated parameter will converge to a constant. Second, transition regimes could still be 
studied, but there would be the additional problem that the value function would not be 
time invariant. This problem could likely be addressed by treating time as an extra state 
variable, but we do not want to enter into these complications and therefore focus on the 
constant gain case.  
 
A further consideration regarding the updating process concerns the information the 
private sector uses when updating its estimates and forming its forecast for next period’s 
inflation. We assume that agents use current inflation when they forecast future inflation 
(discussed further below), but not in updating the parameters. This implies that inflation 
expectations, in period t, for period t+1 may be written simply as: 
(8)  t t t t c π π 1 1 − + = Ε  
Generally, there is a simultaneity problem in forward-looking models combined with 
learning. In (1), current inflation is determined in part by future expected inflation. But 
according to (8), expected future inflation is not determined until current inflation is 
determined. Moreover, in the general case also the estimated parameter c will depend on 
current inflation, if current inflation is used to update the parameter currently used. The 
literature has taken (at least) three approaches to this problem. The first is to lag the 
information set such that agents use only t-1 inflation when forecasting t+1 inflation. We 
followed that route in Gaspar et. al. (2005), extending Gaspar and Smets (2002). A 
different and more common route is to look for the fixed point that reconciles both the 
forecast and actual inflation, but to not allow agents to update the coefficients using 
current information (i.e. just substitute (8) into (1) and solve for inflation). This has the 
benefit that it keeps the deviation from the standard model as small as possible (also the 
rational expectations equilibrium changes if one lags the information set), while keeping 
  8the fixed point problem relatively simple. At an intuitive level, it can also be justified by 
the assumption that it takes more time to re-estimate a forecasting model, rather than to 
apply an existing model. Finally, a third approach is to also let the coefficients be updated 
with current information. This results in a more complicated fixed point problem, which 
is only feasible to solve for smaller problems.
3  
 
Substituting equation (8) into the New-Keynesian Phillips curve one obtains: 
(9)  ()















We are now ready to study the dynamics of inflation under rational expectations and 
adaptive learning when the central bank applies the policy rule (3). In the simulations we 
use the following set of parameters as a benchmark:  
 
β   γ   λ   φ   κ   σ 
0.99  0.5  0.05    0.05  0.07  0.005
                  
 
Gamma is chosen such that there is some inflation persistence in the benchmark 
calibration. The gain, which corresponds to an average sample length of about 10 years or 
40 quarters, is high, but not unreasonably so, to highlight the effects of optimal policy.
 4 
In the limiting case, when the gain approaches zero, the influence of policy on the 
estimated inflation persistence goes to zero and hence plays no role in the policy 
problem.  
 
In this section, we start by considering the case when the central banker does not take 
learning explicitly into account, but uses the reaction function from the discretionary 
rational expectations equilibrium (equation (3)). Figure 2-3 show the distribution of 
output, inflation and the semi-difference of inflation under both types of expectations 
formation. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the estimated inflation persistence 
                                                           
3  It is possible to solve this problem in the current setting. However, we leave this for future research. 
4 See Orphanides and Williams (2004) for a similar calibration of the gains parameter. Milani (2004) 
estimates the gain parameter to be … using a Bayesian estimation methodology 
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distribution of the output gap is the same in both cases (Figure 2). This follows directly 
from the assumption that in both cases the policy maker follows the policy rule given in 
equation (3). As a result, the output gap is proportional to the cost-push shock in both 
cases. Second, and more interestingly, as the Kalman gain parameter increases, the 
distribution of inflation becomes wider and flatter. Concerning inflation, there is 
considerably more mass in the tails when the Kalman gain is 0.05 compared to the 
rational expectations case (Figure 3, top panel). This is also the case for the semi-
difference of inflation (Figure 3, lower panel). As discussed above, these visually small 
differences translate into larger welfare differences due to the quadratic loss function. As 
Table 1 shows, in the benchmark calibration, that learning with an identical policy rule 
from the rational expectations discretionary equilibrium is associated with a 12% higher 
loss than the corresponding rational expectations case. For comparison, if the gain instead 
is substantially smaller, 0.01, the difference shrinks to 3%.
5  
 
The reason for the higher inflation variance is obvious. Under constant-gain least squares 
learning, the estimated degree of persistence will vary over time and in a persistent 
manner. Compared to the rational expectations case, where this parameter is constant, 
this contributes to a higher variance of inflation. The variability of the estimated 
parameter is shown in Figure 4. It is also worth noting that there is a slight increase in the 
mean of the estimated degree of inflation persistence (above 0.5, which is the rational 
expectations case) and that there is a considerable mass of estimated inflation persistence 
close to one. Moreover, when inflation and inflation persistence are high, the dynamics of 
inflation may become explosive. In order to avoid that the simulation breaks down in the 
event of such explosive behaviour, we follow Orphanides and Williams (2004) and 
implement a cut-off point at a value of one for the estimated persistence (in other words, 
the private sector estimates a unit root in inflation). When the estimated parameter is 
greater than one, we assume that the private sector continues to use a unit root process for 
inflation. This partly explains the bunching of estimates of inflation persistence at and 
close to one. In the benchmark calibration, it turns out that the incidence of a binding cut-
off point happens about 0.35% of the time.   
 
                                                           
5 Under rational expectations, there exist a number of equivalent representations of the reaction function 
under discretion. In the case of learning, these are no longer equivalent. As the emphasis of this paper is on 
the optimal policy, we do not exhaust the alternative specifications but settle for the MSV rule. 
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the paper) following a cost-push shock. In both cases, the output gap falls for one period. 
However, the behaviour of inflation is quite different depending on the current estimated 
inflation persistence. Under rational expectations, the inflation response is always short-
lived. In contrast, under adaptive learning the behaviour can vary substantially due to the 
above discussed effect. In sum, neglecting to take account of learning on the part of the 
private sector can be costly.  
 
3. Optimal monetary policy under adaptive learning. 
 
In the previous section, we kept the policy rule constant across the two cases. The 
standard way of using recursive learning is to ask if a certain equilibrium is learnable and 
analyze which policy rules lead to convergence to rational expectations equilibrium. A 
different question is, suppose the central bank knows that the agents are learning in this 
particular way, what is the optimal policy response? In this case the central banker is well 
aware that policy actions influence expectations formation and thereby inflation 
dynamics. The central bank is assumed to know the expectation formation mechanism in 
full. “Sophisticated” central banking implies solving the full dynamic optimisation 
problem, where the parameters associated with the estimation process are also state 
variables.  
 
Specifically, in this case the central bank solves the following dynamic programming 
problem: 
(8)            ( ) ), ( min ) ( , , , 1
2 2
1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , t t t t t t t t
x
t t t t c R u V x R c u V
t
π β λ γπ π π + − − − − Ε + + − =   
subject to the expectations adjusted Phillips curve (7) and the recursive parameter 
updating equations (4) and (5).  
We note that the presence of learning instead of fully rational agents introduces three 
modifications relative to the standard framework under rational expectations. First, the 
agents simply run their regression and make their forecast, so that actual inflation is not 
the outcome of a game between the central bank and the private sector (as is the case 
under discretion and rational expectations). Second, promises of future policy play no 
role as agents look only at inflation outcomes. Hence there is no scope for the type of 
commitment gains discussed in section 2. Third, we leave the linear-quadratic world, as 
the learning algorithm makes the model non-linear.  
  11From a technical perspective, the first two aspects simplify finding the optimal policy 
whereas the third is a complication. The problem is that the value function will not be 
linear-quadratic in the states and hence we resort to non-linear methods in order to solve 
the policy problem. We therefore employ the collocation-methods described in Judd 
(1998) and Miranda and Fackler (2002), which amount to approximating the value 
function with a combination of non-linear polynomials, which translates the problem to a 
root finding exercise (some details are outlined in the appendix). 
Agents use a forecasting model that is not fully correct as they do not take into account 
that the estimated persistence parameter has an effect on policy and hence on the 
evolution of inflation (this is similar to the standard constant gain, but here it is amplified 
also by the non-linearity). Average forecast errors are, however, zero so it is not the case 
that the central bank systematically tricks the private sector. 
 
Figures 5 to 7 describe the distribution of inflation, the output gap and the estimated 
degree of inflation persistence in the case of optimal monetary policy (these figures 
should be compared with Figures 2 to 4 respectively) and Table 1 shows some statistical 
features. A number of observations are worth making. First, comparing Figures 3 and 5, it 
is clear that under sophisticated (optimal) central banking the variance of inflation (and 
also of the semi-difference of inflation) is lower. In particular, optimal monetary policy 
reduces the mass of inflation in the tails (i.e. between 0.02 and 0.03 in absolute value). 
Second, comparing Figure 2 and Figure 6, it is clear that this reduced inflation variability 
comes at the cost of a higher volatility of the output gap. Overall, the loss under the 
optimal policy response is, however, reduced by about 15%.  
 
This result is somewhat analogous to what obtains when we compare the results under 
commitment and discretion in the case of rational expectations. (Table 1) The mechanism 
behind the improvement is, however, substantially different from the rational 
expectations case. Under rational expectations, as argued above, commitment allows the 
central banker to use the future course of policy to spread the impact of economic shocks 
over time. As we have seen, in section 2 the mechanism may be interpreted as a form of 
automatic stabilisation. The central bank, by committing to a persistent response to a 
cost-push shock, induces an undershooting of future inflation. Under rational 
expectations this brings inflation anticipations down thereby mitigating the impact of the 
shock.  
 
  12Under adaptive learning the mechanism must be different as future policy as such plays 
no role at all. However, a common mechanism is that the central bank realises that it can 
influence expectations formation. In the case of rational expectations, the central bank 
realises that credible future policy actions can influence current expectations by making 
the inflation process mean reverting. In the case of adaptive learning, the central bank 
realises it can steer the degree of inflation persistence estimated by the private sector.  
 
To illustrate how this affects the optimal policy response, Figures 8 and 9 show the mean 
dynamic response (the equivalent of impulse responses in a non-linear model) of the 
output gap and inflation for two different values of the initially estimated inflation 
persistence in response to a one-standard-deviation cost-push shock. In one case (dashed 
line), the estimated degree of inflation persistence is 0.3 higher than the mean, whereas in 
the other case (solid line) the initial estimated inflation persistence is 0.3 lower than the 
mean. When the initial inflation persistence is estimated to be high, the effect of a cost-
push shock on inflation is much higher and more persistent (see Figure 9), then when it is 
low. The intuition is simple: With a high degree of estimated inflation persistence, agents 
forecast the effects of the cost-push shock to be persistent and therefore make actual 
inflation much more persistent. As a result, the central bank needs to respond more 
aggressively and in a much more prolonged fashion when inflation persistence is high 
(Figure 8). As the central bank trades off inflation and output variability, high inflation 
persistence therefore clearly increases both inflation and output gap variability. 
 
This costly trade-off mechanism is, however, only a part of the story of the optimal 
policy response. As mentioned before, the central bank also realises that by its policy it 
can steer the future evolution of the estimated inflation persistence and thereby reduce 
future trade-off problems. In particular, realising that a high degree of estimated inflation 
persistence is very costly, it will want to bring the estimated degree of inflation 
persistence down as quickly as possible. It can do this by generating a sequence of 
negative forecast errors, i.e. deliver inflation rates below the private sector expectations, 
which through the recursive learning equations leads to a decrease in the estimated 
persistence. This is exactly what happens in Figure 10, which shows the impulse response 
of the estimated degree of inflation persistence to the cost-push shock under optimal 
policy. Of course, because such a policy is costly in terms of creating a persistently 
negative output gap, the reduction in the estimated inflation persistence is only gradual. 
However, the mean reversion is higher than when the estimated degree of inflation 
persistence is unusually low (also Figure 10). Indeed, the reverse argument can be made 
  13to explain why the central bank has an interest to slow down the upward convergence 
process of the estimated inflation persistence in this case. Again, the central bank realises 
that a low estimated inflation persistence is beneficial in terms of reducing the trade-off 
problem between inflation and output gap variability in the presence of cost-push shocks. 
It therefore will respond less aggressively and persistently in this case, thereby 
prolonging the convergence of the estimated inflation persistence process.     
This asymmetric policy behaviour is reflected in the distribution of the estimated inflation 
persistence shown in Figure 7. First, it results in a downward shift in the mean of the 
estimated degree of inflation persistence. This is again reminiscent of what happens in the 
case of commitment under rational expectations. If one generates inflation data from the 
commitment solution under rational expectations, and estimate an AR(1) process (that is, 
calculate the first order autocorrelation), the result is a coefficient of 0.3, rather than the 
0.5 for the case of rational expectations under discretion. With adaptive learning, the 
optimal policy leads to a mean estimate of 0.42, which lies in between the two cases. 
Second, it is also clear from Figure 7 that the distribution of the estimated inflation 
persistence parameter is now skewed to the left. In particular, realising the cost of high 
estimated inflation persistence, under the optimal policy the central bank ensures that 
only under exceptional circumstances the inflation process wanders close to being a unit 
root process. Comparing Figure 4 and 7, it is clear that the mass of estimated inflation 
persistence higher than 0.8 is significantly lower under the optimal policy case. 
Moreover, under the optimal monetary policy there is no longer any instance of explosive 
inflation behaviour (compared to 0.35% in the case of a naïve central banker). As a result, 
inflation and inflation expectations are much better anchored under sophisticated 
(optimal) central banking. 
 
When the gain is decreased, the tendency to pursue persistent policy is reduced (the 
impulse response of the output-gap “shifts to the left”. When the relative weight of output 
is lower, the degree of stabilization of course is lower and hence the distribution of c is 





In this paper, we compare the conduct of monetary policy in a simple new Keynesian 
model, under rational expectations and adaptive learning. We found that, under a simple 
  14monetary policy rule, the optimal time-consistent rule under rational expectations, 
adaptive learning leads to a deterioration in economic performance. While the 
distribution of the output gap is the same under rational expectations and adaptive 
learning, the distribution for inflation and for the semi-difference in inflation becomes 
wider and flatter. Given a quadratic loss function it leads to significant reduction in social 
welfare. As the Kalman gain is increased, the perceived persistence of inflation becomes 
more sensitive to contemporary developments, and inflation variance increases. 
Moreover, the economy, under adaptive learning, eventually displays explosive 
behaviour. 
 
The literature under rational expectations (see, for example, Woodford (2003)) has found 
that, in case the central bank can commit future policy, it is optimal to follow inertial 
policy. The reason is that, under rational expectations, the central banker is able, through 
a gradual but persistent response to cost-push shocks, to reduce the initial impact of the 
shocks and to spread their impact over time. The stabilizing mechanism operates through 
the effects that future policy actions have on current inflation expectations and, therefore, 
on current inflation. It allows for sizeable welfare gains relative to optimal, time-
consistent policy.  
 
In this paper, we compare full optimal policy, under adaptive learning, with a policy 
following a simple monetary policy rule (naïve central banking). We find that explosive 
dynamics never occur under optimal (sophisticated) policy. Moreover, perceived inflation 
persistence is lower and less dispersed. The results can reasonably be interpreted as 
meaning that inflation and inflation expectations are better anchored under sophisticated 
central banking. Lower perceived persistence contributes to overall stability and delivers 
significant improvement in economic performance. The stabilizing mechanism is 
different from the one described above for rational expectations. Future policy actions 
have no direct effect on expectations. We show that, under adaptive learning, monetary 
policy responds stronger (and more persistently) to cost-push shocks as the perceived 
persistence parameter increases. For low estimated persistence, mean dynamic response 
to a cost-push shock resembles the impulse response function for optimal time consistent 
policy. As estimated persistence increases mean dynamics become more inertial, 
resembling the impulse response function of optimal policy, under commitment. 
 
It is clear that both a central banker with commitment ability, under rational expectations, 
and a sophisticated central banker, under adaptive learning, use the endogeneity of 
  15expectations to improve economic outcomes. The mechanisms, however, are very 
different. In the case of rational expectations it is future policies that matters while, under 
adaptive learning, the effect comes from past policy actions and outcomes. In the real 
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Note that ￿t is used to update ct, but ct is not used by agents to forecast
until t+1. Substituting the second equation into the fourth gives a completely


























Finally, the reward function is





1 + ￿ (￿ ￿ ct￿1)





















We then approximate the value function with splines, along the lines of
Miranda and Fackler (2002).
1Table 1. Variances and expected losses (scaled by 10e-5), ￿ = 0:05.






Commitment, RE 1.56 5.77 1.84
Discretion, RE 2.08 4.08 2.28
Learning, D-rule 2.39 4.08 2.57
Learning, Optimal 1.90 5.51 2.18
2Figure 1: Impulse responses of inflation and output gap, rational expectations 
 
































Figure 2: Distribution of output under discretion 













Discretion: distribution of output gapFigure 3: Distribution of inflation and semi-difference of inflation, rational 
expectations and learning 




























 Figure 4: Distribution of estimated parameter, learning (not optimal) 































 Figure 5: Distribution of inflation, optimal policy 

















Figure 6: Distribution of output gap, optimal policy  
















 Figure 7: Distribution of the estimated inflation persistence, optimal policy 















Figure 8: Optimal policy, mean dynamic response of output to a cost push shock  
 





























Figure 9: Optimal policy, mean dynamic response of inflation to a cost push shock 
 















 Figure 10: Optimal policy, mean dynamic response of estimated inflation persistence 
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